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“A RANK USURPATION OF POWER”1–THE ROLE OF PATRIARCHAL 
RELIGION AND CULTURE IN THE SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN 
GILA STOPLER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental assumption of contemporary feminist theory and practice is 
that gender is a form of power, and a universal one at that.2  The system 
facilitating and entrenching this power—patriarchy—can be defined as the 
manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women in 
society.3  Anthropologist Sherry Ortner argues that in every known culture 
women are considered in some degree inferior to men.4  She identifies three 
types of data that constitute evidence that a particular culture considers women 
inferior: “(1) elements of cultural ideology and informants’ statements that 
explicitly devalue women, according them, their roles, their tasks, their 
products, and their social milieux less prestige than are accorded men and the 
male correlates; (2) symbolic devices, such as the attribution of defilement, 
which may be interpreted as implicitly making a statement of inferior valuation; 
and (3) social-structural arrangements that exclude women from participation in 
or contact with some realm in which the highest powers of the society are felt to 
reside.”5  Although any of these data types will suffice to indicate women’s 
inferiority in a given culture, they might all occur simultaneously and appear 
interrelated.6  This is true in some dominant versions of major religions, such as 
conservative Christianity and orthodox Judaism, in which women are devalued, 
considered impure, and barred from positions of power. 
 
 1. Angelina Grimke, Angelina E. Grimke, Letters to Catherine [sic] E. Beecher, in reply to An Essay 
on Slavery and Abolitionism, addressed to A. E. Grimke, in THE PUBLIC YEARS OF SARA AND ANGELINA 
GRIMKE SELECTED WRITINGS 1835–39 146, 197 (Larry Ceplair ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE PUBLIC 
YEARS]. 
 * Assistant Professor, Academic Center of Law & Business, Ramat Gan Israel, JSD, LLM NYU 
School of Law; LLB Tel Aviv University. 
 2. Nicholas Dirks et. al., Introduction to CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY: A READER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 3, 33 (Nicholas Dirks et. al. eds., 1994); ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA 
LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL- COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE 
33 (1993). 
 3. This definition is adapted from Gerda Lerner, who defines patriarchy as “the manifestation 
and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children in the family and the 
extension of male dominance over women in society in general.” GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF 
PATRIARCHY 239 (1986) [hereinafter THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY]. 
 4. SHERRY B. ORTNER, MAKING GENDER: THE POLITICS AND EROTICS OF CULTURE 23 (1996). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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This article discusses the way in which the power of religion and culture 
perpetuates the hegemony of patriarchy. Although religion and culture are as 
fundamental to women as they are to men and are shared by both women and 
men, the current legal protection afforded to patriarchal aspects of religion and 
culture perpetuates patriarchy’s hegemony and seriously undermines women’s 
ability to achieve equality.  Although freedoms of religion and association and 
the right to culture are equally important to women and men, how these rights 
are understood and applied perpetuates gender hierarchy and deprives women 
of equality and freedom rather than ensuring their freedom of religion and 
culture or guaranteeing them equal respect.  Furthermore, liberalism’s skewed 
understanding of the desired scope and content of toleration, religious liberty, 
and cultural and associational rights stems from its lack of an adequate theory of 
power.7  Liberalism disregards the institutions, practices, discourses, and norms 
of a religion or culture as a socially and politically significant site of power, 
which severely curtails its ability to ensure that the exercise of power and 
authority over the individual is justified and that the rights of the individual are 
safeguarded.8 
Part II will present the concepts of power, culture (and religion), and 
hegemony and will expose the ways in which the power of religion and culture 
creates and perpetuates the hegemony of patriarchy.  Part III will utilize a 
historical perspective to describe the advent and perpetuation of patriarchy and 
the historical relationship between patriarchy and patriarchal religion.  Part III.A 
will provide an overview of the creation of patriarchy primarily through 
patriarchal religion.  Part III.B will describe its perpetuation through the control 
of knowledge and paternalistic dominance.  Part III.C will analyze the insightful 
critiques of church and state offered by early American feminists, such as the 
Grimke sisters and Elizabeth Cady Stanton.  Historically, feminists, especially 
religious feminists, have recognized the central role of religion in women’s 
oppression and have demanded equality for women inside as well as outside 
religion.  Modern feminism has largely neglected the call for equality within 
religion, assuming, following the enlightenment and its underlying 
assumptions, that it is both possible and desirable to guarantee equality for 
women in society at large without directly confronting religious prejudice and 
that religion and its accompanying prejudice are a passing phenomenon.  This 
change within feminism can be explained both by the apparent loss of power 
that patriarchal religion has suffered after the severance of its long-standing, 
official ties with the state and by the inability of liberal feminism to properly 
analyze and critique the power patriarchal religion has retained despite severing 
its ties with the state.  Nevertheless, recent struggles between feminism and 
conservative religion over the ERA and abortion demonstrate the power of 
patriarchal religion is very much alive, and its ability to safeguard the 
hegemony of patriarchy and circumvent women’s struggle for equality is 
considerable. 
 
 7. FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 2, at 193.  See also NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, 
DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 26 (1989). 
 8. FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 2, at 76. 
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Part IV will claim that despite the constitutional separation between church 
and state, patriarchal religion continues to influence—directly and indirectly— 
the law and to constitute a significant force perpetuating the hegemony of 
patriarchy.  Part IV.A will describe how religious doctrines prescribing the 
subordination of women have entered American law and remain there under 
different guises to this very day.  Part IV.B will argue that religious freedom, 
freedom of association, and the right to culture are being used as “status 
enforcing mechanisms” to maintain women’s subordination.9  Part IV.C will 
utilize the abortion controversy to demonstrate how patriarchal religion affects 
current law, and part IV.D will challenge the notion that toleration requires 
acceptance and protection for patriarchal religious practices.  Finally, part IV.E 
will argue that a proper analysis of the power of religion and culture and the 
way in which it is used to maintain the hegemony of patriarchy would result in 
a very different understanding of the desired scope and content of toleration, 
religious liberty, and cultural and associational rights than current liberal 
understanding.  Specifically, toleration should be required and religious liberty 
and cultural and associational rights should be vigorously protected. But such 
protection should not entrench unequal power relations and the hegemony of 
patriarchy.  When the freedom of a patriarchal religion to continue practices that 
subordinate women conflicts with the right of women to receive equal treatment 
both inside and outside religion, the right of women should prevail. 
II. POWER/CULTURE/HEGEMONY: HOW THE POWER OF RELIGION AND CULTURE 
CREATES AND PERPETUATES THE HEGEMONY OF PATRIARCHY 
A. Power 
The most influential theorist of power, Michel Foucault, is said to have 
revolutionized the western perception of power.  Foucault posited that a major 
problem with western perceptions of power is both the representation of power 
in a juridical form and its attribution to the sovereign.10  “The language of power 
is law, not magic, religion or anything else.”11  It is focused on the rights of the 
individual vis-à-vis the sovereign and neglects all other forms of power that 
threaten individual rights.12  According to Foucault, a proper analysis of power 
must extend beyond the limits of the state both “because the state, for all the 
omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field 
of actual power relations, and further because the state can only operate on the 
basis of other, already existing power relations.”13  Thus, Foucault posited that 
 
 9. The term “status enforcing mechanism” is borrowed from Reva B. Seigel, Discrimination in 
the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, in 
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 99 (Robert C. Post et. 
al. eds., 2001). 
 10. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS 1972–1977 109, 119–21 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et. al. trans., 1980). 
 11. Id. at 201. 
 12. Id. at 121–22. 
 13. Id. at 122. 
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power is everywhere; it is exercised from “within the social body rather than 
from above it,” and it is deeply, albeit covertly, invasive.14 Power is a productive 
social network defined by “a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated 
cluster of relations.”15  Furthermore, power cannot be recognized simply by its 
appearance as a negative force.  Power is accepted because it is a hierarchical, 
productive force that “induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces 
discourse.”16  As Phelan explains, “[p]ower operates through discourses that 
define and legitimate its operation.”17  This understanding of power is highly 
compatible with the view that culture and its religious subsets are a major site of 
power.  Importantly, Foucault posited that power relies on the appearance of 
freedom.18  It covertly guides conduct and suggests possible outcomes because 
the person upon whom it is exercised is envisioned as a person whose actions 
are freely chosen.19  In this respect, religion and culture are quintessential sites of 
power because they are highly determinative of individual actions and are 
regarded as positively informing rather than obstructing free choice. 
Arguably, the inadequacy of the liberal theory of power stems from its 
individualistic structure and inability to consider the group as a crucial mediator 
between the individual and the state.20  An analysis that recognizes groups both 
as a crucial site of power and a crucial reservoir of power that can be utilized by 
members both within and outside the group entails a different understanding of 
existing power relations and their effects on individuals.  The focus on the state 
as the major, or even sole, threat to individual rights is particularly evident in 
theories of political liberalism, wherein the commitment to maintaining freedom 
from the state in the private sphere of community far exceeds the commitment 
to protect the individual from private oppression.21  But if power is everywhere, 
then the liberal framework envisioning the private sphere as a power-free zone 
of rights is mistaken.22  Moreover, as Fraser points out, employing Foucault’s 
analysis, “the proliferation of discourse governed by this liberal framework may 
itself function . . . to mask the actual character of power and thus to conceal 
domination.”23  Consequently, Fraser argues that Foucault can be understood to 
advocate a “politics of everyday life” because “if power is instantiated in 
 
 14. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Prison Talk, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 10, at 37, 39. 
 15. MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Confession of the Flesh, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 10, at 194, 
198. 
 16. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 10, at 109, 119. 
 17. Shane Phelan, Foucault and Feminism, 34 AMERICAN J. OF POL. SCI. 421, 424 (1990). 
 18. Id. at  425. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 2, at 197. 
 21. The prime example is Rawls’ theory of political liberalism which “rather than confronting 
religious and nonliberal doctrines with a comprehensive liberal philosophical doctrine . . . (aims) to 
formulate a liberal political conception that those nonliberal doctrines might be able to endorse.”  
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, xlvii (1996). 
 22. FRASER, supra note 7, at 26. 
 23. Id. at 26–27. 
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mundane social practices and relations, then efforts to dismantle or transform 
the regime must address those practices and relations.”24 
B. Culture 
Foucault’s theory of power is particularly conducive to a proper analysis of 
the power that culture, and religion as an important part of culture, has in 
people’s lives.25  Although in the past “one of the core dimensions of the concept 
of culture has been the notion that culture is ‘shared’ by all members of a given 
society,” it has now become clear to contemporary anthropologists that when 
“we speak of culture as shared, we must always ask ‘by whom?’ and ‘in what 
ways?’ and ‘under what conditions?’”26  Furthermore, contemporary 
anthropology emphasizes “the degree to which culture is grounded in unequal 
relations and is differentially related to people and groups in different social 
positions.”27  Surveying developments in the theory of anthropology since the 
sixties, Ortner argues that while in the past anthropological research has 
emphasised what culture enables people to see, feel, and do, it has since moved 
to emphasize the ways in which culture restricts people’s actions and feelings.  
Precisely because anthropologists agree that culture effectively shapes the 
reality that people live in, they consider this reality with critical eyes and 
question why that particular reality has been created and what sorts of 
alternative realities people are prevented from experiencing.28  Ortner further 
argues that although material and political constraints such as force are fully 
acknowledged, there is considerable agreement among anthropologists that 
culture and religion systematically constrain action  by controlling people’s 
“definitions of the world,” limiting “their conceptual tools,” and restricting 
“their emotional repertoires.”29  Thus, religion and culture restrict most deeply 
by becoming part of the self.30 
C. Hegemony 
 
 24. Id. at 26. 
 25. Kymlicka defines societal culture as “a culture which provides its members with meaningful 
ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, 
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.” WILL KYMLICKA, 
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 76 (David Miller & Alan Ryan 
eds., 1995).  Religion is an essential part of culture and the more religious the community the greater 
religion’s part in defining the culture of that community.  On religion as a cultural system, see Gidon 
Sapir, Religion and State—A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 631–32 (1999).  For 
this reason, religion and religious culture had a crucial role in creating the hegemony of patriarchy 
that was far greater than the role of secular culture.  Consequently, my use of the term “culture” 
should be understood as referring not only to secular culture but also, and even mainly, to religion 
and religious culture.  Similarly, I often use the terms religion and culture together in order to 
emphasize the role of religion and not to suggest that religion is not a part of culture. 
 26. Dirks et. al., supra note 2, at 3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Sherry Ortner, Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties, in CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY, supra 
note 2, at 372, 396. 
 29. Id. at 397. 
 30. Id. 
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The strength and depth of the power of culture and the central roles of 
domination and subordination in forming culture are perhaps best captured in 
Antonio Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony.”31  Hegemony is “the power to 
establish the ‘common sense’ or ‘doxa’ of a society, the fund of self-evident 
descriptions of social reality that normally go without saying.”32  If culture is 
traditionally understood as the social process by which people define and shape 
their lives, then hegemony goes beyond this traditional understanding by 
relating culture to specific distributions of power and influence.33  Thus, 
hegemony’s most important contribution is recognizing that culture is both 
political and ideological because it is produced to serve certain dominant 
interests.34  But, the concept of hegemony also expands beyond “ideology” in 
insisting that our perception of the world is not only shaped merely by a 
conscious system of ideas and beliefs but also by our whole lived experience 
that is itself shaped by specific and dominant meanings and values.35  
Hegemony is not solely an ideology and it does not operate just through 
manipulation or indoctrination: 
It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our 
senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of our selves and 
our world.  It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and 
constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming.  It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in society, a 
sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult 
for most members of society to move, in most areas of their lives.36 
Consequently, it is not only the hegemonic culture that becomes part of the 
self, but also the relationship of dominance and subordination upon which the 
culture is founded that becomes an inseparable part of the self.37  Thus, 
hegemony’s most important contribution is stressing that hegemonic culture 
“constitutes the terrains of meaning and feeling that are central to the securing 
of consent and/or the incitement to rebellion,” which renders the use of force 
and coercion to secure cooperation largely unnecessary.38 
This article will argue against legal protections for religion and culture to 
the extent that they serve to perpetuate the hegemony of patriarchy.  Legal 
concepts such as toleration, religious liberty, and associational and cultural 
rights are used, inter alia, to perpetuate the subordination of women, and the 
only way to end the hegemony of patriarchy and replace it with a hegemony of 
equality is to intervene in religion and culture.  According to Williams, 
 
 31. Raymond Williams, Selections from Marxism and Literature, in CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY, 
supra note 2, at 585, 595. 
 32. Nancy Fraser, The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics, 17 
BOUNDARY II 82, 85 (1990). 
 33. Williams, supra note 31, at 595. 
 34. Dirks et. al., supra note 2, at 23. 
 35. Williams, supra note 31, at 595. 
 36. Id. at 596–97. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Dirks et. al., supra note 2, at 23. 
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“hegemony is always a process.”39  “It does not just passively exist as a form of 
dominance,” but “has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and 
modified.”40  Simultaneously, it is also “continually resisted, limited, altered, 
[and] challenged by pressures not at all its own.”41  Thus, hegemony 
presupposes a process in which cultural authority is continuously negotiated 
and contested, but wherein some perspectives have more authority than others.42 
Understanding hegemony as a structure of pervasive domination, which is 
continuously challenged and defended, is important for feminism because it 
highlights both the depth and strength of patriarchal religion and culture’s 
influence over all of our lives and the role of individual agency in defending and 
challenging this structure.  An important feminist critique of structuralist 
theories such as Foucault’s is that they fail to envision power as both a structural 
and an individual concept.43  Therefore, power lies both in the social structures 
and in the individuals who exercise it.  All exercise of power is completed 
within social and cultural structures comprised of discourses and practices that 
make the exercise possible and significant.  Nevertheless, within this socio-
cultural context the exercise of power is by individuals, who are not merely 
affected by power, but are also actively participating in practices and discourses 
that create power by exercising it, resisting it or failing to resist it.44  Although it 
largely determines the positions, practices and discourses of individuals, the 
hegemonic structure is also simultaneously being created and recreated, 
challenged, and defended through the actions, practices, and discourses of 
individual actors. 
A similar understanding of the socio-cultural process is embraced by 
practice theory anthropologists.  In practice theory, human action in seen as both 
“constrained by the given social and cultural order” and as making “structure”“ 
by reproducing it, transforming it, or both.45  Consequently, the refusal of some 
religions to ordain women should be seen both in the context of an established, 
sexist power structure and as an individual exercise of power by religious 
leaders who may have the power to transform the unequal social structure, but 
choose not to act.  Similarly, state refusal to utilize the law to intervene on behalf 
of women who are refused ordination or discriminated against in religious 
positions should also be seen as both a manifestation of the established sexist 
power structure within the state and an individual exercise of power by state 
officials—such as judges or legislatures—who choose to utilize their power to 
protect the system rather than transform it.  Finally, the religious women who 
challenge the discrimination within their own faith, who support it, or who 
merely refuse to challenge it should be understood as individual actors acting 
 
 39. Williams, supra note 31, at 598. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Fraser, supra note 32, at 85. 
 43. FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 2, at 35. 
 44. Id. 
 45. ORTNER, supra note 4, at 2. 
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within their (highly constrained) positions in the patriarchal structure with the 
goal of either transforming or reproducing the structure itself. 
By using the force of law to bar both internal and external challenges to 
patriarchal religion and culture, liberal states are reneging on their expressed 
commitment to transforming the system to achieve women’s equality and are 
subsequently entrenching patriarchal hegemony.  In the legal systems of liberal 
states, the hegemony of patriarchy is partially challenged by equality legislation 
that is aimed at ensuring equality before the law, equality in the public sphere, 
and equality in specific areas such as employment.  However, such challenges 
are inadequate because the nucleus of the hegemonic power of patriarchy lies 
within religion and culture.  If hegemony is secured not through public social 
institutions, but primarily through control over religious and cultural language 
and imagery, through the shaping of everyday practices, and through 
constituting meaning and feeling, then the hegemony of patriarchy can never 
truly be challenged without an outright challenge to the patriarchal practices 
entrenched in most religions and cultures. 
III. PATRIARCHY AND PATRIARCHAL RELIGION–A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. The Creation of Patriarchy 
Early American feminist Angelina Grimke has identified the “mere 
circumstance of sex”46 as the founding force of patriarchy.  A historical study by 
Gerda Lerner reveals that prior to the formation of the archaic states, societies 
existed in which men and women were substantially equal, even though a 
division of labor existed that was based on the woman’s exclusive ability to give 
birth and ensure the survival of the infant given the conditions in prehistoric 
times.47  Far from serving as a justification for male domination, woman’s 
procreative power was venerated, and the first form of religious worship was 
the worship of the Mother–Goddess.48 
Archeological and historical evidence indicates that for thousands of years 
and across cultures the Mother–Goddess was worshiped as the Supreme Being.49  
The power of the goddesses remained active and strong even as women’s 
economic, educational, and legal subordination deepened.50  Lerner posits that 
the development of strong kingships and archaic states brought changes in 
religious beliefs and symbols. The Mother–Goddess figure was demoted and 
gradually replaced with a male Creator–God as the head of the pantheon of 
gods and goddesses51 to whom the power of creation and fertility was 
transferred.  These changes in religious symbols and meanings closely reflect the 
 
 46. Angelina Grimke, supra note 1, at 194. 
 47. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 40–41. 
 48. Id. at 39. 
 49. Id. at 141–60.  See also ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK: TOWARD A 
FEMINIST THEOLOGY 47 (1993) [hereinafter SEXISM AND GOD-TALK]. 
 50. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 141–42. 
 51. Id. at 145. 
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gradual absorption of female rights by the patriarchal structure and the 
transition from matrilineal kinship and royal succession to patrilineal kinship 
and succession.52  Initially, the goddesses had power in their own right, and their 
power was not limited only to sex and procreation but extended to all domains, 
including power on the battlefield and over other gods and kings.53  The 
goddesses and gods were equivalent images of the divine, which had both 
sexual potency and social power.54  As a gradual reflection of the societal change 
in the concepts of gender, the power of the goddesses was transformed into the 
power to intercede with the dominant male god and was restricted to domains 
such as healing and procreation.55  Nevertheless, the worship of the goddesses 
continued to flourish in popular religion while the priests and the ruling elites 
were transforming official religious practices and texts that created the new 
dominance of the male god.56  In fact, archeological evidence shows that the 
goddess Asherah was worshipped alongside the Hebrew god in the Hebrew 
temple for two thirds of its existence.57  For many people, the Hebrew god 
replaced the Canaanite god Baal as the husband of the goddess.58 
Lerner maintains that all religions have to answer three basic questions: (1) 
Who can speak to God? (2) Who creates life? (3) Who brings evil into the world?  
In a brilliant analysis, Lerner demonstrates how through a gradual process that 
culminated with the Hebrew monotheist religion and the Bible, the answers to 
these questions were transformed so as to entrench patriarchal rule and 
women’s subordination and make them appear natural and inevitable. 
1. Who Can Speak to God? 
As long as the worship of goddesses continued, women could find their 
likeness in the image of the female goddesses just as men could find their 
likeness in the image of the male gods.59  Women were empowered both 
symbolically and practically through the goddesses and their priestesses (the 
goddesses usually had female priestesses while male gods had male priests).60  
Thus, women could both speak directly to God and find themselves in God 
without the need for male mediation.  With the advent of monotheist religion 
and the worship of a single, supreme, male God, women’s access to God was 
severely curtailed, and they were rendered powerless in their religious life.  
Although in the early texts the Hebrew god was not gendered and could 
theoretically embody both male and female aspects, he has always been 
perceived as a male Father–God.61  The result has been the emergence of an all 
 
 52. Id. at 154–58. 
 53. Id. at 143. 
 54. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 52. 
 55. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 159. 
 56. Id. at 158. 
 57. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 56. 
 58. Id. 
 59. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 160. 
 60. Id. at 142, 178. 
 61. Id. at 178. 
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male priesthood.  Women had no place in the religious ritual, neither functional 
nor administrative or even as a member of the cult fellowship.62  Though at first 
women and men congregated together for worship, by the time of the second 
temple women were no longer allowed to enter the area of the temple reserved 
for those who took part in the religious ritual.  Segregation between men and 
women was created, and women could no longer speak to God.63 
The basis for excluding women from speaking to God is the biblical story of 
the covenant between God and the Hebrews, in which God promises the chosen 
people collective immortality in the form of many generations of children, land, 
power, and victory over their enemies if they fulfill certain obligations under the 
covenant.64  In the biblical story, the covenant God makes with Abraham, which 
is later confirmed in his covenant with Moses, is a covenant between God and 
man alone wherein woman has no place.65  God makes the covenant with 
Abraham alone and not with Sarah.  It is only Abraham who God addresses, 
and it is only he who God advises of his and his progeny’s rights and duties 
under the covenant.  Thus, the leadership of the patriarch over his family and 
tribe is given divine sanction.66  Sarah’s relation to the covenant as the bearer of 
Abraham’s children embodies the relation of women to both religion and the 
state for generations to come.67  Consequently, Sarah is the means through 
whom God’s covenant with Abraham and His promise to multiply Abraham’s 
seed is to be carried out. But, her relation to the covenant itself and therefore to 
God exists only through her relationship to Abraham and her role as the child-
bearer.  Following God’s covenant with men, women can no longer connect 
directly to God but must connect to Him indirectly through men.68 
2. Who Creates Life? 
The symbol chosen as the token of the covenant, circumcision, is a 
powerful representation of the exclusion of women.69  Women are irreversibly 
excluded from the covenant both because they do not have penises and because 
similar to the focus on Abraham’s seed, the focus on the male penis signifies the 
shift from the female to the male procreative role.  This shift fosters the belief 
that man creates life and therefore has a right over both his wife and his 
progeny.70  The transformation from the worship of woman’s sexual and 
reproductive role, represented by the worship of goddesses, to man’s 
metaphysical appropriation of these roles, is powerfully illustrated in the story 
of creation in the Book of Genesis.  The biblical story of Adam and Eve is one of 
the most powerful myths of western civilization and has defined the 
 
 62. Id. at 177–78. 
 63. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 178–79. 
 64. Id  at 193; Genesis 17 (King James). 
 65. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 189–90. 
 66. Id. at 190. 
 67. Id. 
 68. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 53. 
 69. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 190–92. 
 70. Id. 
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relationships between men and women on both theoretical and practical levels 
for generations.71  After creating Adam, the man, from the dust of the earth, God 
put Adam to sleep and from his rib he created his mate, who Adam then named 
Woman.72  In this story not only does a male God create humanity, but also 
reverses the biological and natural order of things in making woman evolve 
from man’s body and not man from woman’s body.73  Thus, man’s right to 
ownership over woman stems both from Adam’s power in naming Eve just as 
he names the animals74 and from the physical fact that Eve is created out of 
Adam’s rib so Adam is seen as “giving birth” to Eve.75  Consequently, as Lerner 
observes, the prevailing assumption throughout Genesis is that humans are 
born to men and that the physical act of procreation is a male act in which no 
mothers are involved.76  Adam’s “giving birth” to Eve is an act devoid of any 
sexual nature, pain, or blood and involves only Adam and God.  The only other 
birth in the history of the Judeo–Christian tradition in which no sexual 
intercourse is involved is Mary’s immaculate conception of Jesus.  The event 
also represents the lost alternative before the Fall, when “pure nature, as it came 
forth from the hand of God, was totally under the power of the Spirit, and so 
was without evil and was not subject to death.”77  Mary’s ability to give birth 
without sexual intercourse, an unprecedented phenomenon after the Fall, raises 
her to a level above all other women.  As part of their punishment for the Fall, 
women are obliged to engage in sexual intercourse in order to procreate and are 
destined to give birth in pain and suffering. 
3. Who Brings Evil into the World? 
After the woman ate from the tree of knowledge and seduced Adam into 
eating as well, they were both banished from paradise and Adam renamed the 
woman Eve, for “she was to be the mother of all living.”78  The creation of Eve 
from Adam’s rib has been seen as proof of the God-given inferiority of woman.79  
An additional justification for women’s inferiority in the Christian tradition is 
found in Eve’s responsibility for the fall of Adam, which was interpreted to hold 
all women responsible for the advent of evil into the world.80  At the time of the 
writing of Genesis, “the snake was clearly associated with the fertility goddess 
and symbolically represented her.”81  Thus, it is the woman’s inducement by the 
 
 71. MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION 44–
45 (1985); ORIT KAMIR, EVERY BREATH YOU TAKE: STALKING NARRATIVES AND THE LAW 30 (2001); THE 
CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 182. 
 72. Genesis 2:21–23 (King James). 
 73. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 181. 
 74. Id. 
 75. ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, NEW WOMAN NEW EARTH, SEXIST IDEOLOGIES AND HUMAN 
LIBERATION 15 (Beacon Press 1995) (1975). 
 76. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 187. 
 77. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 151. 
 78. Genesis 3:20 (King James). 
 79. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 183. 
 80. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 167–68. 
 81. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 196. 
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snake, which represents the fertility goddess and in turn a woman’s own free 
sexuality, that is responsible for the Fall.82  Woman’s punishment for her act is 
comprised of her eternal subjugation to her husband, the restriction of her 
sexuality solely for purposes of procreation within the conjugal relationship, 
and the pain of child bearing.83  In Christian thought, woman’s role as a 
submissive wife and mother is not only her punishment but also her only means 
of salvation.84 
In the service of patriarchy, the story of Creation establishes the following 
facts: (1) God granted procreative power to man and not to woman; (2) sexual 
intercourse, pregnancy, and childbirth are not an expression of women’s unique 
power to procreate (which God placed with man), but the physical 
manifestations of women’s punishment for the Fall; (3) man’s closer relationship 
with God along with his procreative power entitle him to ownership of both 
women and their offspring, which are exclusively man’s offspring.  
Furthermore, if woman’s punishment for the Fall is both to be the vessel of 
man’s procreative power and to suffer pain and sorrow while performing this 
role, then one could argue that treating women as a means for procreation 
becomes not only permissible but necessary and commendable.  More 
importantly, a woman who tries to obstruct in any way—such as through 
contraceptives or abortion—the fulfillment of her procreative obligations, 
should be condemned for trying to avoid the deserved punishment God has 
ordained for her and for attempting to prevent man from fulfilling his own 
procreative obligation to God.  If it is woman (Eve) who through her 
disobedience is to blame for her destiny to give birth and suffer for it, what right 
does she have to object to this destiny or try to manipulate it?  After all, had it 
not been for woman’s disobedience, procreation might have been achieved 
painlessly and magically through man’s body (e.g., the creation of Eve) without 
any soiling female involvement.85 
Viewed this way, the story of creation provides an airtight justification for 
man’s superiority over woman, for his right to control her sexuality and 
procreative ability (and therefore her body), and for his right to possess both her 
and her offspring.  The only thing left to ascertain is that woman has no power 
to challenge this story because man exerts a monopoly over knowledge.  
Ironically, Eve was the first to eat from the Tree of Knowledge and the first to 
acquire the ability to distinguish good from evil.  Consequently, she was 
banished from the Garden of Eden along with Adam.  Nevertheless, it is the 
denial of women’s moral capacity and their ability to distinguish right from 
 
 82. Id. at 198. 
 83. Id. at 196; Genesis 3:16 (King James). 
 84. “But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence.  
For Adam was first formed, then Eve.  And Adam was not deceived but the woman being deceived 
was in the transgression.  Notwithstanding she shall be saved in childbearing, if they continue in 
faith and charity and holiness with sobriety.” 1 Timothy 2:12–15 (King James). 
 85. See Gila Stopler, Gender Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 
43 (2005) [hereinafter Gender Construction] (Discussing the use of the myth of Adam and Eve and the 
suppression and demonization of Eve’s counter image–Lilith–as a framework for the construction of 
gender in the western world and on the implications of this use for liberal equality). 
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wrong that maintains the hegemony of patriarchy and justifies women’s 
subordination.  This denial of women’s moral capacity is at the heart of the 
critique of patriarchy and of patriarchal religion by abolitionist feminists such as 
the Grimke sisters.86 
The symbolic devaluing of women in relation to the divine is achieved in 
the Hebrew monotheist religion through the establishment of a supreme, male 
God who makes a covenant exclusively with men that excludes women from the 
religious ritual and from the religious symbol systems.  Through the portrayal of 
woman, especially her sexuality, as the source of all weakness and evil, this 
symbolic devaluation becomes one of the two founding metaphors of western 
civilization.87  Aristotelian philosophy supplies the other founding metaphor 
and holds “that women are incomplete and damaged human beings of an 
entirely different order than men.”88  Whereas male is active female is passive; 
whereas male is soul female is matter.89  Whereas the male is a complete human 
being comprised of both matter and soul, the female is a mutilated male who 
lacks soul and is only matter.90  This incompleteness of the woman makes her 
inferior in her capacities, in her ability to reason, and in her ability to make 
decisions, making man’s rule over woman just as natural and expedient as 
man’s rule over the animals.91  Thus, we see that the hegemony of patriarchy, 
which is crucially dependent on the divine sanction granted to it by patriarchal 
religion, is further expanded and entrenched through patriarchal philosophy.  
These concepts coalesce and are deeply rooted in Christian thought wherein 
male superiority is the embodiment of the transcendent mind, and the female 
embodies an inferior physical nature, body, and passions and represents the 
source of sin.92  On the basis of these two founding metaphors of western 
civilization, the subordination of women is seen as natural, and the stereotypes 
regarding women appear to represent reality, resulting in the firm establishment 
of patriarchy as an actuality and as an ideology.93  Therefore, the hegemony of 
patriarchy is established. 
B. The Control of Knowledge and Paternalistic Dominance as Key Elements of 
the Hegemony of Patriarchy and Patriarchal Religion 
1. Control of Knowledge 
One of Foucault’s most important insights is that power operates by 
forming knowledge and producing discourses that define and legitimate its 
operation.94  Men’s monopoly over defining, determining, and interpreting truth 
 
 86. See the discussion of the Grimke sisters and other abolitionist feminists infra. 
 87. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 199–201. 
 88. Id. at 10. 
 89. Id. at 206–07. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 207–08. 
 92. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 93. 
 93. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 211. 
 94. Phelan, supra note 17, at 424. 
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and knowledge perpetuates the hegemony of patriarchy and maintains men’s 
control over women.  Nowhere is the structure of patriarchy more evident than 
in patriarchal religions, which are built on two pillars of control—men’s control 
over truth and knowledge, which ensures their control over women, and men’s 
control over women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity.  The considerable 
influence of patriarchal religions in liberal democratic societies also manifests 
itself along these same two pillars of control.  In the United States this is 
demonstrated very well in the abortion controversy.  The “knowledge” that life 
begins at conception not only serves to prevent women within some patriarchal 
religions from having abortions, but when allegedly severed from its religious 
origins and presented as socio-cultural “knowledge,” this “knowledge” also 
serves to justify legal restrictions on abortions imposed by the secular state.95  
The control of women’s reproductive ability and the division of labor attached 
to it has been crucial in maintaining men’s control of knowledge.  Throughout 
history men have left themselves free to control culture by relegating most tasks 
of domestic production and reproduction to women.96  Based on their 
procreative abilities, women have been assigned to perform all of the domestic 
work, leaving men free to engage in cultural and religious definitions that justify 
and normalize this division of labor.  Accordingly, women’s procreativity and 
sexuality have served as the basis for creating the hegemony of patriarchy by 
excluding women from the creation of religion and culture and by turning them 
from persons into property.  These exclusions enable the proprietor 
(father/husband) to exploit their labor, fail to remunerate it, and declare it non 
existent and insignificant while still relying on it as the indispensable basis for 
his own achievements.97 
Patriarchal religions are not alone in using male domination of knowledge 
and truth to control women’s sexuality and reproductive rights.  As Betty 
Friedan shows in her classic book The Feminine Mystique, scientific, 
psychological, and cultural male-generated “truths” have served, as late as the 
second half of the twentieth century, to reduce women to the role of complacent, 
procreative machines.98  The hegemony of patriarchy is subsequently maintained 
through mutually reaffirming religious, cultural, and scientific knowledge and 
discourses.  Although the control over knowledge and truth formation in most 
disciplines and institutions in many liberal states is still largely in the hands of 
men, most liberal states are at least formally committed to rectifying the 
situation and achieving equality within these institutions.  But, the opposite is 
true with regard to religion, whereby liberal states are committed to protecting 
the right of religious patriarchs to preserve their own hegemony by invoking 
concepts such as freedom of religion and freedom of association, autonomy, and 
toleration. 
 
 95. See, e.g., Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), discussed infra. 
 96. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 74. 
 97. Id. at 261–63. 
 98. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). 
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2. The Priesthood and the Control of Knowledge 
Carol Gilligan defines patriarchy as a “hierarchy—a rule of priests—in 
which the priest, the hieros, is a father.  It describes an order of living that 
elevates fathers, separates fathers from sons (the men from the boys), and places 
both children and women under a father’s authority.” 99  However, the sons will 
grow up to become fathers, but the women will never do so.  The order of 
religious patriarchy is also established in the Garden of Eden story; God over 
Adam, Adam over Eve, and the serpent at the bottom.  Eve and then Adam eat 
from the Tree of Knowledge and are punished by God through the 
establishment of patriarchy.100  Patriarchy, according to Gilligan, is “secured by 
the prohibition against knowing what you know through experience, a 
prohibition that creates the need for the priesthood.”101  In patriarchy “the 
fathers stand at the top of the hierarchy, serving as priests—the interpreters of 
truth, the dispensers of goodness, those with direct access to power, mediating 
relationships with power for those below.”102 
Likewise, Radford Ruether suggests that the patriarchal domination of men 
over women and fathers over children is duplicated in the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy in the form of clericalism.103  The basic assumption of clericalism is that 
the people have no direct access to the divine and the priests are the only ones 
capable of preaching, teaching, and mediating between God and the laity.104  
While the “male laity may be allowed subordinate roles within this system of 
clerical power,” women are excluded from such roles altogether and “become 
the archetypal representatives of the passive recipients of clerical sacral 
power.”105  Consequently, Radford Ruether argues that “it is impossible to 
liberate the Church from patriarchy and retain a clerical definition of the 
ministry.”106  A similar claim was made more than a century and a half ago by 
the Grimke sisters, two of the first American abolitionist feminists, who posited 
that the church government would have to come down in order for women and 
slaves to gain their rights.107 
Both aspects of patriarchy that are identified by Gilligan, sex and age, pose 
an almost insurmountable obstacle for women in their attempt to challenge 
patriarchal religions from within and to regain their right to interpret truth and 
determine knowledge.  While the sex factor keeps women subordinate to men, 
the age factor keeps the system in place by immunizing ancient rules from 
modern challenges.  The reverence for the old and its superiority over the new is 
 
 99. CAROL GILLIGAN, THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE 16 (2003). 
 100. Id. at 205. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 156. 
 103. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 207. 
 104. Id. at 206–07. 
 105. Id. at 207. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Angelina Grimke, Angelina E. Grimke to Theodore Dwight Weld and John Greenleaf Whittier, in 
THE PUBLIC YEARS OF SARA AND ANGELINA GRIMKE SELECTED WRITINGS 1835–1839 281, 284 (Larry 
Ceplair ed., 1989). 
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the hallmark of patriarchal religion.108  For example, in Orthodox Judaism the 
authority of a biblical interpretation is determined first and foremost by its 
antiquity, with older interpretations invariably superior to newer ones.  This is a 
fatal blow for those who attempt to change discriminatory interpretations of 
biblical rules in favor of more egalitarian understandings.  Truth and knowledge 
become a more or less fixed essence, determined and controlled by men, the 
priests–fathers, who are its sole judges and interpreters.  Women who attempt to 
change these discriminatory interpretations are silenced and excluded from the 
community of believers with the assistance of the State, which prefers the right 
of community leaders to determine who belongs to the community to the right 
of the women to challenge their discrimination.109  Reducing women to silence is 
an important tool in women’s subordination.  Men define the world for both 
men and women from the men’s point of view and dismiss interpretations that 
come from the women’s point of view.110  When done in the name of religion and 
culture, the liberal state not only condones this action but also considers it a 
fundamental right.  The control over knowledge is preserved, the hegemony of 
patriarchy is protected and, the liberal framework is used “to mask the actual 
character of power and to conceal domination.”111 
3. Paternalistic Dominance 
Foucault’s insight that power operates through discourses that define and 
legitimate its operation is also well demonstrated by the central role of 
paternalistic dominance in perpetuating patriarchal hegemony.  Paternalistic 
dominance is a subset of patriarchal relations in which the relationship of 
dominance “is mitigated by mutual obligations and reciprocal rights.”  Women 
“exchange submission for protection and unpaid labor for maintenance.”112  
Dominance is disguised as benevolence, and sexism—the ideology of male 
supremacy and superiority over women—serves as the “factual” basis that 
explains to women why they need this form of paternalism while 
simultaneously allowing men to convince themselves that they are only acting 
in everyone’s, especially women’s, best interests.113  As Radford Ruether 
poignantly observes, women trade “a diminished humanity for dependent 
forms of security.”114  Because women’s subordination is maintained primarily 
through paternalistic dominance within the structure of the family, which is 
traditionally understood as a haven of loving relations, it lends particular 
credibility to the claim that benevolent domination obscures the political 
implications of women’s subordination. 
 
 108. See e.g., Leslie C. Allen, The Old Testament in Romans I-VIII, 3 VOX EVANGELICA 6, 6 (1964). 
 109. See e.g., MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN, FAITHFUL AND FEARLESS: MOVING FEMINIST PROTEST 
INSIDE THE CHURCH AND MILITARY 132–58 (1998). 
 110. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 74–75. 
 111. FRASER, supra note 7, at 26–27. 
 112. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 239–40. 
 113. Id. at 240–41. 
 114. SEXISM AND GOD-TALK, supra note 49, at 173. 
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The central role of paternalistic benevolence in perpetuating patriarchy is 
essential to understanding the role of patriarchal religion in maintaining the 
hegemony of patriarchy.  Religious hierarchy—God over man, man over 
woman—is crucially based on benevolence and love.  Just as God’s relation to 
both man and woman is one of benevolent hierarchy, so man’s relation to 
woman, and in particular to his wife, is also one of benevolent hierarchy.  While 
the notion that women are weak and inferior is aimed at persuading them that it 
is futile and dangerous to resist the hierarchy, the notion that the hierarchy is 
based on love and ordained by God is aimed at persuading women that it is 
sinful, immoral, and ungrateful to resist it.  Thus, religion is relied on as both the 
foundational justification for women’s subordination to men and as a “daily 
aid” in securing this subordination.115  In sum, the hegemony of patriarchy in 
religion is maintained by the existence of a clear gender hierarchy, immune from 
change and presented as benevolent and ordained by God. The hegemony of 
patriarchy maintains a monopoly on power and knowledge by prohibiting 
women, on account of their sex, from knowing what they know through their 
own experience and teaching them to live their lives according to the knowledge 
produced by the male elite.  What makes this structure seem natural and 
inevitable to so many women is not only its eternality, but also its pervasiveness, 
mutatis mutandis, across disciplines and cultures. 
C. Religion as a Major Tool in the Oppression of Women—The Views of Early 
American Feminists 
In her book The Creation of Feminist Consciousness, Gerda Lerner maintains 
that for more than a thousand years women’s major intellectual enterprise was 
to re-conceptualize religion in such a way that would give them an equal and 
central role and counteract the pervasive patriarchal assumptions of their 
inferiority and incompleteness as human beings.116  According to Lerner, 
“[w]omen’s striving for emancipation was acted out in the arena of religion long 
before women could conceive of political solutions for their situation.”117  Lerner 
identifies both “the misogynist explanatory system that dominated church 
doctrine and shaped ideas of gender in society,” and the belief “in the God-
given inferiority of women and their subordinate position” as the major causes 
for women’s subservience and their difficulties in fighting their oppression to 
create a feminist consciousness.118  All women, whether religious or not, were 
adversely affected by the core Biblical texts which were used time and again by 
patriarchal authorities to justify women’s subordination.119  The prohibitions on 
women’s thinking, teaching, and speaking in public were all based on biblical 
authority and “[t]hese biblical core texts sat like huge boulders across the paths 
women had to travel in order to define themselves as equals of men.”120 
 
 115. Id. at,170. 
 116. GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS 10–11 (1993). 
 117. Id. at 11. 
 118. Id. at 46–47. 
 119. Id. at 138. 
 120. Id. 
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1. The Grimke Sisters 
Sara and Angelina Grimke, two of the most important abolitionist 
feminists, recognized the inseparability and interrelation between equality at the 
state level and equality within religion as early as the middle of the nineteenth 
century.  Given their special life circumstances and the period in which they 
lived, perhaps it is not surprising that the Grimke sisters saw so clearly almost 
two centuries ago what is hidden from the eyes of so many today.  The sisters 
were born into a southern slave holding family but left the South due to their 
deep objections to slavery and their own family’s commitment to the practice in 
particular and settled in the north.121  Their antislavery activism and the negative 
reactions they received as women trying to speak publicly in front of northern 
audiences led them to develop the analogy between the immoral prejudices of 
racism and sexism.122  Catharine Beecher, an avid believer in the heavenly 
ordained superiority of man, and in separate spheres for men and women, who 
was a strong objector to the Grimke’s public speaking, received a letter from 
Angelina explaining that “[t]he investigation of the rights of the slave has led me 
to a better understanding of my own.”123  In another letter, Angelina suggests 
“the rights of the slave [and] woman blend like the colors of the rainbow.”124  
According to Angelina, all human beings have rights because they are moral 
beings, and although these rights can be wrested from the slave, his entitlement 
to them will not change.  Similarly, the “mere circumstance of sex” does not give 
man higher rights than those of woman because this physical circumstance is 
secondary to the moral nature of both men and women.125 
The Grimke’s public speaking on abolition brought to the forefront the 
parallel issue of women’s rights and elicited strong condemnation of the sisters 
from ministers of the church.  Strong pressure was subsequently applied to the 
sisters by various leaders of the abolitionist movement to stop addressing the 
issue of women’s rights altogether.126  In response to this pressure, the sisters 
expressed their conviction that they could not effectively fight for abolition 
without defending their own right to speak their minds in public.  They asserted 
that the attack on them was part of a deep-laid scheme of the clergy to silence 
women and prevent them from exercising their right to conscience.127  “What 
then can woman do for the slave, when she is herself under the feet of man 
[and] shamed into silence,”128 or alternatively, what power can woman have if 
she is not even allowed to speak?  According to the sisters, the struggles for the 
abolition of slavery and for women’s rights were two inseparable parts of the 
same whole, and the church government, which stood in the way of reform on 
 
 121. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM 
AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW 83 (1998). 
 122. Id. at 83–84. 
 123. THE PUBLIC YEARS, supra note 1, at 194. 
 124. Id. at 286. 
 125. Id. at 194. 
 126. Id. at 281–93. 
 127. Id. at 283. 
 128. Id. at 284. 
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both issues, would have to come down in order for the reform to take place.129  
Matilda Joslyn Gage, a contemporary of the Grimkes and an avowed feminist in 
her own right, pointed to the clergy attacks on the Grimke sisters and the timid 
response of the anti-slavery leadership as the cause of the sisters’ withdrawal 
from public advocacy for the abolitionist movement.130  Importantly, the power 
utilized by the church to silence the Grimke sisters and to perpetuate the 
hegemony of white patriarchy was neither the power of law nor that of the 
sovereign.  It was strictly the private power of religious and cultural prejudice in 
a society in which women were, in the words of Elizabeth Cady Stanton “slaves 
of custom, creed and sex”131 that silenced the Grimke sisters and put an end to 
their struggle for equality and freedom. 
The race–sex analogy, coupled with their deep religious convictions and 
the openly and pervasively sexist society in which they lived allowed the 
Grimke sisters to see clearly that equality for women can simply not be achieved 
until it is achieved not only at the state level but also in custom and creed.  
Angelina writes: 
Now, I believe it is woman’s right to have a voice in all the laws and regulations 
by which she is to be governed, whether in Church or State; and that the present 
arrangements of society, on these points, are a violation of human rights, a rank 
usurpation of power, a violent seizure and confiscation of what is sacredly and 
inalienably hers—thus inflicting upon woman outrageous wrongs, working 
mischief incalculable in the social circle, and in its influence on the world 
producing only evil, and that continually.132 
According to Grimke, women have a right to complete equality in both 
church and state because each one exercises power over women and women’s 
lack of voice evidences their lack of power.  Equality in society demands 
equality of power in both church and state and cannot be ensured by having one 
without having the other.  Thus, when the state defends patriarchal religion and 
culture and denies women the right to equality within them, such denial is not 
merely a neutral exercise aimed at ensuring religious and cultural freedom but a 
usurpation of power and a violation of human rights. 
2. Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a contemporary of the Grimke sisters who is best 
known for her leadership role in organizing the Seneca Falls women’s rights 
convention in 1848 and in the struggle for women’s suffrage, was one of the 
fiercest critics of the role of religion in the oppression of women.133  Her 
publication of a feminist interpretation of the bible called The Woman’s Bible led 
to her condemnation by the National American Woman Suffrage Association, 
and due to the uncompromising nature of her views, she was unable to obtain 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE, WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE 447 (1893). 
 131. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER: CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, 
SPEECHES 81 (Ellen Carol Dubois ed., 1981) [hereinafter READER]. 
 132. THE PUBLIC YEARS, supra note 1, at 197 (emphasis added). 
 133. READER, supra note 131, at 182–93. 
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the financial backing necessary for the publication of her speeches and 
writings.134  Stanton believed that religion was the most effective tool for the 
subordination of women, for “she never could have been held the pliant tool she 
is to day but for the subjugation of her religious nature to the idea that in 
whatever condition she found herself as man’s subject, that condition was 
ordained by Heaven . . . .”135  The major problem was women’s internalization of 
their own subordinate position.  “[A]ll the religions on the face of the earth 
degrade her, and so long as woman accepts the position that they assign her, her 
emancipation is impossible.”136  After describing her own emancipation from 
“false theology,” which was facilitated by her discussions with William 
Garrison, Stanton asks, “[i]s the bondage of the priest-ridden less galling than 
that of the slave, because we do not see the chains, the indelible scars, the 
festering wounds, the deep degradation of all the powers of the God-like 
mind?”137  Thus, as early as the mid-nineteenth century feminists such as Stanton 
have had an acute understanding of the way hegemony ensures domination by 
constituting “the terrains of meaning and feeling that are central to the securing 
of consent and/or the incitement to rebellion” thereby rendering the use of force 
and coercion to secure cooperation largely unnecessary.138 
With the growing influence of organized religion in the women’s 
movement and in American politics in general in the 1880’s and the 1890’s, 
Stanton’s lifelong interest in the relationship between religion (especially 
Christianity) and the idea of women’s inferiority grew stronger.139  
Consequently, she published The Woman’s Bible in which she and other feminist 
writers gave their own feminist interpretations of biblical passages that were 
traditionally used to justify the subordination of women.140  In the introduction 
to The Woman’s Bible, Stanton explained the centrality of religion to the 
oppression of women and responded to the criticisms aimed at her project.  
First, she pointed to the Bible as the source of women’s divinely ordained 
inferiority and described how this idea was used by both the church and the 
state to justify woman’s subservience to man: 
The Canon and the civil law; church and state; priests and legislators; all 
political parties and religious denominations have alike taught that woman was 
made after man, of man, and for man, an inferior being, subject to man.  Creeds, 
codes, Scriptures and statutes, are all based on this idea.  The fashions, forms, 
ceremonies and customs of society, church ordinances and discipline all grow 
out of this idea . . . .141 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 136. 
 136. Id. at 232. 
 137. Id. at 80.  William Lloyd Garrison was a prominent abolitionist and social reformer and one 
of the founders of the American Anti-Slavery Society. 
 138. Dirks et. al., supra note 2, at 23. 
 139. Id. at 228. 
 140. Id. 
 141. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, THE WOMAN’S BIBLE, PART ONE (1895), in READER, supra note 
131, at 229. 
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Next, Stanton turned to answer the criticisms leveled against her.  
Interestingly, the two major arguments raised against her project are the same 
arguments still raised today against those who suggest challenging patriarchal 
religion.  These enduring, albeit contradictory, arguments offer on the one hand, 
that it is audacious and impolitic to challenge religion (presumably because it is 
a challenge to people’s deeply held beliefs), and on the other hand that it is a 
useless waste of energy to criticize something as obsolete and inconsequential as 
religion.142  To the charge of audacity and lack of political prudence Stanton 
queried: 
Why is it more ridiculous for women to protest against her [sic] present status in 
the Old and New Testament, in the ordinances and discipline of the church, 
than in the statutes and constitution of the state? . . . Women have compelled 
their legislators in every state in this Union to so modify their statutes for 
women that the old common law is now almost a dead letter.  Why not compel 
Bishops and Revising Committees to modify their creeds and dogmas?143 
She insists that women’s situation cannot be changed without arousing 
religious opposition and that “an entire revolution in all existing institutions is 
inevitable” if such a “far-reaching and momentous” reform as changing 
woman’s position from a subordinate to an equal is to be achieved.144  
Importantly, Stanton reminds us that “all reforms are interdependent” and that 
those who compromise cannot achieve reform.145  With regard to the claim that 
the Bible is inconsequential and that most intelligent women have no reverence 
for it, Stanton’s reply is as accurate and as forceful today as it was over a 
hundred years ago:. 
So long as tens of thousands of Bibles are printed every year, and circulated over 
the whole habitable world, and the masses in all English-speaking nations 
revere it as the word of God, it is vain to belittle its influence.  The sentimental 
feelings we all have for those things we were educated to believe sacred, do not 
readily yield to pure reason . . . .146 
Thus, in the past patriarchal religion was the primary force shaping culture 
and the state yet today religion and the state have been largely separated and 
culture has expanded beyond the realm of religion.  But, the assumption that by 
simply ignoring patriarchal religion and its misogynistic teachings it is possible 
to negate their current influence remains as futile as the assumption that by 
simply ignoring power we negate it existence: 
[M]any of us are under the impression that all we have to do is not enter a 
church, refuse to practice the sacraments, and never read the sacred texts in 
order to be free from the influence of religion in our lives . . . . This does not 
solve the problem of how significant is the influence of religion upon culture.  
Thus, we are all imbued with the many Greek, Latin, Asian, Jewish and 
 
 142. Id. at 231–32. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 232. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 232–33. 
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Christian traditions, at least, particularly through the art, philosophy and myths 
we live by, exchange, and perpetuate, often without our realizing.  Simply 
negating what already exists cannot make the passage from one era to the 
next.147 
The consequences of women’s inequality within religion and culture are far 
reaching.  As Lerner argues, “the structuring of society in such a way that 
women were for millennia excluded from the creation of the cultural product 
has more decisively disadvantaged women in their economic and political rights 
than any other factor.”148  Because hegemonic culture along with the relations of 
dominance and subordination become an inseparable part of the self,149 the 
hegemonic culture “constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a 
sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult 
for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.”150  Today 
liberal states, such as the United States, do not outright exclude women from 
shaping culture.  Nevertheless, they actively and no less successfully, assist in 
perpetuating the hegemony of patriarchy by protecting the right of powerful 
patriarchal religions and other patriarchal communities to exclude women from 
positions of power.  The result is that women have no voice in the shaping of the 
internal cultures of many communities within the state and consequently have 
much less than an equal say in the shaping of the overall culture of the state.  By 
tolerating discrimination and protecting the religious, cultural, and associational 
rights of the leaders of patriarchal religious and cultural groups, and by refusing 
to assist dissenters within those groups to shape the group’s cultural product, 
the state legitimates the continued existence of overt patriarchy and protects 
patriarchy’s power base from any external and even internal challenge. 
IV. PATRIARCHY, RELIGION AND THE LAW 
A. Religious Law as the Law Governing the Rights of Early American Women 
The United States Constitution is silent on issues of women and family, 
leaving the power to regulate women’s status and the family relationship to the 
states through the Tenth Amendment.151  All states have chosen to perpetuate 
the English common law doctrine of coverture,152 thereby incorporating 
essentially a highly discriminatory religious view of women into their laws.  
This transformation from religious edict to common law tradition and then to 
civil law is particularly interesting for two reasons: first, because it demonstrates 
 
 147. TOVA HARTMAN HALBERTAL, APPROPRIATELY SUBVERSIVE, MODERN MOTHERS IN 
TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS 2 (2002) (quoting LUCE IRIGARAY, JE, TU, NOUS: TOWARDS A CULTURE OF 
DIFFERENCE 23 (1993)). 
 148. LERNER, supra note 116, at 272. 
 149. Williams, supra note 31, at 596–97. 
 150. Id. 
 151. BARBARA ELLEN BABCOCK ET. AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE 
AND THEORY 16 (2nd ed. 1996). 
 152. Id. at 16–17. 
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the way patriarchal religion has operated as the fundamental force behind the 
creation of the hegemony of patriarchy in society; second, because it reveals the 
way in which the decrease in the power and centrality of religion and the 
increase in the power of non-religious culture have transformed patriarchal 
religious edicts into patriarchal non-religious traditions, which later could be 
legitimately incorporated into civil law without offending the mandate of 
separation between religion and the state. 
In her epic book, Women, Church and State, Matilda Joslin Gage, a 
nineteenth century American feminist, described in detail how the ecclesiastical 
or canon law with regard to marriage and the status of women became 
incorporated into English common law and was later adopted into the civil law 
of the States of the Union.153  She argued that following the incorporation of 
canon law into the common law, “the complete inferiority and subordination of 
woman ha[d] been as fully maintained by the State as by the Church.”154  For 
example, Gage argued that the canon law that forbids women to “presume to 
teach a man in a public assembly” became the basis for the common law rule 
which denied women admittance to the bar, the pulpit or medicine.155  This 
contention is fully substantiated by Bradwell v. Illinois in which the Supreme 
Court explained that Myra Bradwell’s attempt to obtain a license to practice law 
contradicted both the common law of coverture and the law of the creator.156  
Furthermore, canon law that barred a wife from leaving her husband without 
his consent also prohibited anyone from harboring or sheltering her under 
penalty of law.  Gage recounted a court case in New York that awarded a 
husband who sued those who sheltered his wife after she left him ten thousand 
dollars on the basis of this canon turned common law.157  Thus, while American 
men were guaranteed the First Amendment protections of free exercise and non 
establishment of religion, American women’s lives were subjected entirely to 
patriarchal religious law transformed into patriarchal common law and later 
incorporated into civil law which was buttressed by the coercive powers of the 
state.  A law which, in Stanton’s words turned American women into a legal 
nonentity.158 
According to the rules of coverture, women lost their legal capacities, 
which were transferred to their husband and master upon marriage.  The 
woman’s rights to her property and her earnings were transferred to her 
 
 153. JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130, at 145–53.  See also HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, Chapter 5 
(1861), available at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/maine/anclaw/chap05. 
(“The Scandinavian laws, harsh till lately to all females, are still remarkable for their severity to 
wives. And scarcely less stringent in the proprietary incapacities it imposes is the English Common 
Law, which borrows far the greatest number of its fundamental principles from the jurisprudence of 
the Canonists.”). 
 154. JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130, at 145. 
 155. Id. at 146. 
 156. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 157. JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130, at 149. 
 158. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of New York on Women’s Rights, February 14, 
1854, in READER, supra note 131, at 44, 48. 
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husband, and she was no longer able to contract or file suit in her own name.159  
The wife became subordinate to her husband and was subject to his power to 
chastise her160 or even to rape her with impunity.161  The justification for the 
woman’s complete loss of status and individual rights following her marriage 
was based on her consent to the marriage and on the concept of the union 
formed between husband and wife upon marriage.  As Nancy Cott explains, 
“[b]oth the emphasis on consent and the principle of union seamlessly adapted 
Christian doctrine to Anglo-American law.”162  The rules of coverture were 
directly applicable only to married women; however, because in the prevailing 
ideology of the time all women were either on their way to marriage, married, 
or widowed, these rules defined not only women’s relationship to the man they 
married, but also their place in the polity in general.163  For example in Bradwell, 
the Supreme Court explained that although it is true that many women are 
unmarried and are therefore not affected by the duties and incapacities which 
the state imposes on married women, unmarried women are “exceptions to the 
general rule” and the rules of civil society cannot be based on such exceptions.164  
Consequently, the same rules excluding married women from the bar applied to 
unmarried women as well. 
The same Founders who guaranteed to all men free exercise and non 
establishment of religion as constitutional rights simultaneously incorporated 
religious notions of women’s subordination into the American civil law and 
thereby ensured the continued subordination of women in the new Union.165  It 
is likely that neither the Founders nor most other Americans of that period ever 
felt the contradiction or questioned the propriety of incorporating these 
religiously-based discriminatory notions into the American civil law.  It might 
even be argued along the lines of contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine, 
that the states had a good secular reason to incorporate the religiously-based 
English common law with regard to women’s marriage rights namely because it 
was part of the common law of England that was incorporated en masse as the 
civil law of the various states.166  Nevertheless, it is exactly this sort of allegedly 
innocuous incorporation of patriarchal religion and culture into the civil law 
that is still prevalent today,167 and best explains why exempting the patriarchal 
religious and cultural communities from the need to abide by norms of equality 
 
 159. Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love:” Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE. L.J. 2117, 
2122–23 (1996). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See e.g. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (1981). 
 162. NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11(2000). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873). 
 165. According to Babcock, “Sixteen of the subscribers to the first American edition of 
Blackstone’s commentaries were signatories of the Declaration of Independence, six were delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention.”  BABCOCK ET. AL., supra note 151, at 17. 
 166. See, e.g., Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), discussed infra note 183. 
 167. See, e.g., Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 306–12 (1984). 
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serves to perpetuate the hegemony of patriarchy and flies in the face of ensuring 
women’s right to equality and freedom in the liberal state. 
B. Religious Freedom, Freedom of Association and the Right to Culture as 
Status-Enforcing Mechanisms 
Similar to any other hegemony, the hegemony of patriarchy has 
throughout history been challenged, contested, and transformed accordingly.  
Lerner stresses that throughout history, patriarchy appears in various forms and 
modes and its structure and function shift and change as it adapts to female 
pressure and demands.168  A common example is the law of coverture, which 
transformed religious law into common law and then into civil law with each 
transformation intended to perpetuate the hegemony of patriarchy in the most 
appropriate means for the particular day and age. 
In several historical studies, Reva Seigel demonstrates how “status 
regimes” evolve over time in order to preserve social stratification.169  Group 
inequalities that are socially pervasive and persistent (articulated across social 
domains and over time) are typically referred to as a condition of social 
stratification.170  Social stratification is formed through the social structure—such 
as institutions (slavery or marriage) and practices, and through social 
meaning—such as stories and reasons.171  According to Siegel, what is perhaps 
most visible in a historical perspective is the heterogeneity of institutions, 
practices, stories, and reasons that sustain the unequal social position of 
different groups over time.  The elements of social structure and social meaning 
that sustain stratification vary by group and within groups, and they evolve 
over time as their legitimacy is contested.172  Struggles over group inequality that 
transform the rules and reasons by which social stratification is enforced and 
justified are termed by Siegel “preservation through transformation.”173  Thus, 
her account of social stratification and how it is created, maintained, contested, 
and transformed is very similar to the traditional concept of hegemony used in 
this article to describe the process of social and cultural domination and 
subordination. 
But, her account lacks the crucial explanation of the manner in which the 
hegemonic order (or what Siegel would term the “status regime”) becomes part 
of the self, even for the subordinated group.174  Her account is illuminating 
 
 168. THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, supra note 3, at 239. 
 169. See e.g. Reva Siegel “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2175–79 
for a detailed explanation of status regimes and their evolvement over time. 
 170. Reva B. Seigel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts 
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 99, 105 (Robert C. Post et. al.) (2001) [hereinafter Discrimination in the Eyes 
of the Law]. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 143. 
 174. For discussion of the patriarchal construction of gender in western societies, see Gender 
Construction, supra note 85. 
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however in how she shows historically that law can be used covertly as a status-
enforcing mechanism (that is, to perpetuate hegemony) without appearing to do 
so.  It is plausible to argue that precisely because hegemony constitutes the self, 
it is so hard for us to identify and resist the law when it is used to perpetuate 
hegemony.  At the same time, it is important for us to question the assertion that 
the law is neutral and to continuously examine the ways in which allegedly 
neutral laws can serve to perpetuate domination and subordination. 
Seigel shows how in various instances—such as racial segregation of public 
accommodation, violence against women, and married women’s property—
prior regimes of social stratification and overt discrimination that were 
previously sanctioned by the state were abolished after it became politically 
incorrect to maintain them and how in their place, a new discourse of privacy 
was used to maintain, at least to some degree, the previous discrimination on 
allegedly benign grounds.175  Seigel argues that privacy has replaced open racism 
and sexism as a status-enforcing mechanism.176  A similar development can be 
traced with respect to the use of patriarchal culture and religion as status-
enforcing mechanisms used to maintain women’s subordinated position in 
society and perpetuate the hegemony of patriarchy. 
After centuries in which the state and church openly combined their forces 
to subjugate women and maintain male dominance through a combination of 
civil and canon laws, the unholy pact between church and state was allegedly 
severed, but the civil law concerning women remained unchanged, its 
fundamental principles still based on discriminatory canon law.177  At the same 
time that America prided itself on its “wall of separation” between religion and 
the state, common law principles derived solely from canon law were used to 
deny women all their rights through the institution of coverture.178  After long 
struggles, women succeeded in eliminating the legal institution of coverture, but 
as Seigel points out in her studies, many of the notions underlying this 
institution have remained and women’s subordination is maintained through 
the use of new juridical forms such as the invocation of privacy.179  Similarly, 
when it became improper to justify women’s inequality at the state level on 
grounds of Godly authority, formal equality at the state level was enacted 
contemporaneously while women’s subordination within patriarchal religion 
was maintained by invoking privacy, religious freedom, and freedom of 
association.  In addition, the regulation of sex and sexuality, including issues 
such as abortion which have a crucial impact on women, continued to be largely 
determined by patriarchal religious morality, albeit disguised as non-religious 
 
 175. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1116–29 (1997) 
[hereinafter Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects]. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See generally JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130. 
 178. JOSLIN GAGE, supra note 130, at 145–53. 
 179. Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 175, at 1118.  “By the turn of the century, 
courts seeking to justify wives’ continuing legal disabilities described marriage as an emotional 
relationship subsisting in a private realm ‘beyond’ the reach of law–reasoning about the relationship 
in these terms would have startled Blackstone.” 
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tradition.180  Today, the state continuously refuses to intervene in patriarchal 
religion and culture on behalf of women, leaving them the impossible task of 
achieving equality from a position of deep inferiority.  Worse still, as will be 
discussed below, even though equality is the professed norm in the United 
States and separation between religion and the state is allegedly maintained, the 
state still continues its support for patriarchal religion and culture by enforcing 
their patriarchal morality and financing patriarchal religion through voucher 
programs, charitable choice, and tax cuts.181 
C. How Do Patriarchal Religion and Culture Affect the Law Today? 
Even today, through a use of their political power, patriarchal religions and 
cultures that discriminate against women and in which women have little voice, 
shape the law and through it the rights of all women.  While the constitutional 
separation between church and state may prevent an overt state-wide 
institutionalization of religion, it is powerless to prevent the insertion of 
patriarchal religion into politics, which adversely impacts the rights of all 
women.  Contemporary struggles that may have important ramifications 
affecting the life of every American woman are being waged by feminists 
against an increasingly politically powerful Christian Right over matters such as 
abortion, contraception and sex education.182 
One pertinent example concerning abortion is Harris v. Mcrae, in which a 
challenge was made to the Hyde amendment which prohibits federal funding of 
abortions for Medicaid recipients except when the continuation of the 
pregnancy would endanger the woman’s life.183  The plaintiffs in Mcrae argued 
that the Hyde amendment was a violation of the Establishment clause because it 
codified the teachings of the Roman Catholic church with regard to abortions. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that the fact that the 
law happens to coincide with the teachings of a certain religion does not lead to 
a violation of the Establishment clause as long as there is a legitimate secular 
purpose for the law.184 
Beyond the court’s intentional failure to take notice of the connection 
between the law and Roman Catholic teachings, the secular purpose that the 
Court found is particularly instructive.  According to the Court, denying federal 
funding for abortions is not an establishment of religion because “[t]he Hyde 
 
 180. See, e.g., JANET JAKOBSEN & ANN PELLEGRINI, LOVE THE SIN 19–44 (2003) (discussing Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.186 (1986) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)); see also discussion of 
Harris v. Mcrea, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) in section C below. 
 181. See Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community and 
Women’s Equality, 10 WILL. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 459 (2004) [hereinafter The Free Exercise of 
Discrimination]. 
 182. See, e.g., CRISTINA PAGE, HOW THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT SAVED AMERICA: FREEDOM, 
POLITICS AND THE WAR ON SEX (2006); Patricia Donovan, The Adolescent Family Life Act and the 
Promotion of Religious Doctrine, Vol. 16, No. 5 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 222 (Sep.–Oct., 1984); 
Amy Nunn et. al., “Contraceptive Emergency: Catholic Hospitals Overwhelmingly Refuse to 
Provide EC,” 24 Conscience 38 (2003). 
 183. Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 184. Id. at 319. 
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amendment . . . is as much a reflection of ‘traditionalist’ values towards 
abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion.”185  The 
Court might very well be right.  Patriarchal values are prevalent in both culture 
and religion, and consequently in law. 
Although it is often reiterated that the impetus for state legislation enacted 
in the mid-nineteenth century banning abortion originated in the medical 
profession, it is also true that the physician’s campaign was largely based on the 
then-controlling societal perception about women’s godly-ordained roles and 
duties and was couched in religious terms that directly appealed to religious 
prejudices regarding women.  In her detailed historical analysis of anti-abortion 
legislation in the United States, Siegel demonstrates how doctors have used 
religious understandings of women’s roles to advance their claim that the 
community has the right and the duty to control procreation through the 
medical profession,186 and how they used the women’s movement’s support for 
abortion to generate support for their own anti-abortion campaign by 
associating the right to abortion with the attack on established gender roles.187  
As Siegel argues, nineteenth century laws banning abortions were explicitly 
based on the discriminatory view that women are destined solely for the home 
and for the rearing of children, and should be understood in that context.188  In 
the present, critics of the recent Gonzales v. Carhart decision could not fail to 
notice that the five Supreme Court justices who voted to uphold the ban on 
partial birth abortion and thus reverse the seven-year-old Stenberg v. Carhart 
decision were all Catholics.189  These critics could not help but wonder how this 
fact could be reconciled with the constitutional separation between church and 
state.  The critics’ critics answered in return that the allegation that the five 
justices decided the case on the basis of their religious beliefs could not be 
substantiated because religion was not mentioned once throughout the 
decision.190  It is probably impossible to find clear evidence supporting either 
side of this unfinished debate.  Nevertheless, it is becoming clearer than ever in 
recent years that the notion that women’s rights are protected by the 
constitutional separation of church and state from the reach of patriarchal 
religious ideas is patently wrong.191 
Thus, the hegemony of patriarchy is maintained by translating patriarchal 
religious edicts and patriarchal cultural assumptions into patriarchal law.  In a 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 296–97 (1992) [hereinafter Reasoning from the Body]. 
 187. Id. at 314. 
 188. Id. at 356. 
 189. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which Roberts, C.J., and Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 
(2000); Robert Barnes, Did Justices’ Catholicism Play Part in Abortion Ruling?, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 
30 2007, at A13. 
 190. Barnes, supra note 189, at A13. 
 191. On the various facets of the relationship between religion and the state and its effects on 
women’s rights, see Gila Stopler, The Liberal Bind: The Conflict Between Women’s Rights and Patriarchal 
Religion in the Liberal State, 31 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 191 (2005). 
05_STOPLER.DOC 11/24/2008  9:56:09 AM 
 USURPATION OF POWER 393 
 
society such as the United States, in which separation between religion and the 
state is allegedly maintained, religiously-based patriarchal edicts are buttressed 
by non-religious patriarchal traditions in order to legalize patriarchal laws.  In 
countries that do not mandate separation between church and state, patriarchal 
law can rest directly on religious grounds.192  But, one could argue that this is 
merely a semantic difference.  The fusion so clearly apparent in Mcrae between 
patriarchal religious values, patriarchal traditional values, and patriarchal laws 
demonstrates the central argument of this article, namely, that the hegemony of 
patriarchy is maintained through the creation of patriarchal values within 
patriarchal religions and cultures which are then incorporated into patriarchal 
law.  Because power operates through discourses that legitimate its operation 
and conceal domination, it is exactly the hegemonic nature of patriarchy which 
keeps us oblivious to its pervasive presence.193  As a result, the fundamental 
problem with Mcrae, namely that it maintains the domination of women by 
usurping their power to control their bodies, cannot even be discussed in terms 
of domination and subordination because in a patriarchal world abortion is not 
a matter of women’s equality.194  At the same time, the underlying cause of the 
problem is that the patriarchal religious and cultural assumptions that are the 
basis for the law cannot be challenged because they are protected by religious 
liberty, by the right to culture and by freedom of association.  This is how the 
hegemony of patriarchy is maintained. 
D. Toleration and Equality 
One of the concepts that has been most distorted due to liberalism’s lack of 
a proper understanding of power is toleration, which is regarded by many as 
the fundamental tenet of liberalism.195  Because calls for tolerance are made 
without taking into account the power relations between those who demand 
toleration and those who suffer the consequences thereof, the result is that most 
often toleration is itself used as a status enforcing-mechanism.  This is 
particularly true with regard to women, who are a-priori excluded from most 
accounts of toleration.  Thus, while both discourse and practice are replete with 
demands and grants of toleration for those that discriminate against women for 
reasons of culture and religion, women’s demands for equality and the right to 
conscience within their religion and culture are rejected as incompatible with the 
principles of toleration.  This is not surprising.  Due to its origin as a remedy for 
religious persecution of one group by another, toleration has mostly been 
understood as applying between groups and not within them.  Arguably, the 
remedy for intra-group dissenters—the right to exit—is the exact opposite of 
toleration because it protects the right of the dominant group members to be 
 
 192. See, e.g., The Free Exercise of Discrimination, supra note 181, 483–95 (2004) (discussing the case 
of Israel and drawing comparisons to the situation in the United States). 
 193. See discussion of power and hegemony in section II. 
 194. Reasoning from the Body, supra note 186, at 347–80. 
 195. E.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, xxvi (2nd ed. 1996). 
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intolerant while forcing the dissenters to exit the group and search elsewhere for 
equality and for their right to conscience.196 
This conflict between toleration and women’s rights is not a light matter.  If 
power operates through discourse and if toleration is one of the most, if not the 
most, powerful concepts of liberalism, then the discursive opposition between 
women’s equality and toleration places anyone who tries to argue for women’s 
equality within culture and religion at a serious disadvantage.  Nonetheless, a 
proper understanding of toleration would entail the exact opposite result.  
Toleration as properly understood can only be invoked to restrain the use of 
arbitrary and prejudiced power against powerless “others.”  When it is used to 
enforce and perpetuate arbitrary and prejudiced power, toleration is being 
misused.  Thus, toleration properly understood would entail respect for 
women’s right to equality and to conscience within their religion and culture 
both from members of their communities and from society at large.197  All 
invocations of toleration as justification for the continued subordination of 
women are in conflict with the true meaning and purpose of toleration and 
serve as a status-enforcing mechanism that perpetuates the hegemony of 
patriarchy. 
Two critiques of toleration are pertinent for understanding the way in 
which the current concept of toleration can obstruct women’s rights.  First, 
toleration is used to sustain social structures of inequality, and second, the focus 
on toleration leads to the condemnation of the struggle against injustice rather 
than the condemnation of injustice itself.198  Toleration as it is currently 
understood reinforces the status quo by calling for an almost indiscriminate 
acceptance of existing hierarchies, practices, and customs, regardless of any 
adverse consequences.  The anti-judgmental character of tolerance makes people 
reluctant to take sides and to distinguish those who are being wronged from 
those inflicting the wrong.199  Consequently, injustice is obscured and even 
denied.  This is inimical to women’s rights because in most groups that demand 
and receive toleration, women are subordinated and the practices and customs 
tolerated are aimed at keeping them in that position.  Even worse, in a culture in 
which the struggle against injustice rather than injustice itself is perceived as the 
major threat to public order and to peaceful co-existence, women who try to 
challenge the existing hierarchy are silenced and branded as intolerant 
extremists.200  If reserving judgment is a virtue then critiquing is a vice and 
struggling to change that which is not perceived as wrong, while stirring up 
 
 196. For a related argument on the reliance on the right to exit as reinforcing conservative 
tendencies, see Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and 
Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 214 (2002). 
 197. See, e.g., Habermas’ position that there should be no tolerance for prejudice and 
discrimination. Jurgen Habermas, Intolerance and Discrimination, 1 I. CON 2, 3 (2003). 
 198. JAKOBSEN & PELLEGEINI, supra note 180, at 58. 
 199. Id. at 59. 
 200. E.g., on the reaction of the Catholic Church to attempts by women activists to challenge 
existing discriminatory norms, see MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN, FAITHFUL AND FEARLESS MOVING 
FEMINIST PROTEST INSIDE THE CHURCH AND MILITARY 134–48 (1998). 
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conflict and strife, is especially problematic.  Thus, toleration becomes a status-
enforcing mechanism that perpetuates the hegemony of patriarchy. 
Nevertheless, if, as Ronald Dworkin famously argues, equality is the 
ultimate value of any plausible political theory, then it must come before 
toleration, and not vice versa.201  As Habermas posits, the elimination of 
prejudice must precede any talk of toleration, and though we must tolerate 
people who think differently or have different beliefs from our own, prejudices 
on the basis of religion, ethnicity, race, or sex must not be tolerated.202  The 
appropriate solution to prejudice is combating discrimination rather than calling 
for “more tolerance,” and the classification of particular beliefs as prejudices 
should be done “in light of the principle of equal treatment of all citizens, 
especially given the notion of ‘full membership’ by everybody.”203  This strict 
intolerance of prejudice, if applied to private actors such as religious and 
cultural communities, has the potential to revolutionize the status of women in 
society.  However, intolerance to prejudice should be accompanied by an 
analysis of power that will allow us to decide what private actors should be 
targeted.  While eliminating prejudice on all levels is certainly desirable, 
enforcing non-discrimination obligations on individuals in their intimate 
relations for example would seem decidedly undesirable.204  An analysis of 
power would enable us to identify and dismantle the structures of power that 
create and maintain male dominance and female subordination. 
E. A Power Based Analysis of Toleration, Religious Liberty, and Cultural and 
Associational Rights 
There is no reason why a proper analysis of private power should not be 
incorporated into our understanding of toleration, religious liberty, and cultural 
and associational rights.  The inclusion of considerations of inter-group and 
intra-group power disparities in our understanding of the desired scope of 
toleration and of religious, cultural, and associational rights would ensure 
greater justice and equality not only for women, but for disempowered groups 
in general.  Although a proper analysis of power will rule out tolerating 
religious and cultural practices that discriminate against women within 
disfavored groups, it will simultaneously require tolerating other practices of 
such groups, which do not involve discrimination or harm to others, and which 
are of high religious or cultural value to people.205  When toleration, religious 
 
 201. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality Part III: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7 (1987). 
 202. Jurgen Habermas, Intolerance and Discrimination, 1 I. CON 2, 3 (2003). 
 203. Id.  Hence, a religious or cultural belief justifying the inferiority of classes of people (such as 
women) and advocating the denial of their full and equal rights should be considered prejudice and 
must not be tolerated.  On the precedence of equality over culture, see generally BRIAN BARRY, 
CULTURE AND EQUALITY (2001). 
 204. The right to intimate association and its scope was defined in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620–21 (1984).  On the application of this right to religious associations, see The 
Free Exercise of Discrimination, supra note 181, at 509–10. 
 205. See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (in which employing the 
suggested approach would lead to an opposite result than that of the court, allowing the use of 
peyote for religious rituals). 
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liberty, and cultural and associational rights are understood as means for 
empowering individuals by enabling them to live their lives fully within the 
cultural and religious contexts that constitute part of their selves, then a line can 
be drawn between those practices that empower some at the expense of others, 
and are therefore forbidden, and those practices that empower people without 
disempowering others, and should therefore be protected. 
Under a proper analysis of power, the traditional liberal solution to the 
subordination of women within religious and cultural groups—tolerating the 
discrimination but safeguarding the right of exit would be found lacking.206  The 
liberal suggestion that the appropriate remedy for discrimination within the 
group is for the oppressed to exit and establish their own group does not 
provide any real solution for the oppressed, both because it is impracticable and 
because exit only entrenches and legitimates the differences of power instead of 
mitigating them.  As for impracticability, it is questionable that the oppressed 
have the practical and psychological ability or the desire, to leave the 
community.207  The assumption that the disempowered can and should do what 
the most powerful would find very hard to do is facetious.208  As for the 
entrenchment of power differentials, although it is true that exit, if practicable, 
may enable oppressed religious women to establish their own egalitarian 
religion, this will in no way change the social reality in which their egalitarian 
religion will be largely powerless while the power to influence society and to 
dictate social conditions, norms, and perceptions will remain in the hands of the 
male leaders of the patriarchal religions.  Furthermore, the reliance on the option 
of exit protects patriarchal power from the need to answer calls for change 
within the community and delegitimizes those who seek such change from 
within.209 
Finally, when incorporating an analysis of power into our understanding of 
toleration, religious liberty, and cultural and associational rights we should take 
into account all forms of power and power disparities, including the power of 
the state, the power of dominant religious and cultural groups, the power, or 
lack thereof, of minority or non-dominant religious and cultural groups, and the 
power, or lack thereof, of individuals within each group.  This would necessitate 
that the use of state power to ensure equality for women must be done across 
the board, targeting dominant religious and cultural groups that discriminate 
 
 206. The right of exit is often suggested by liberals as a remedy for in-group discrimination.  See 
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, A RESTATEMENT 93 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001); JEFF SPINNER-HALEV, 
SURVIVING DIVERSITY: RELIGION AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 53 (2000). 
 207. The Free Exercise of Discrimination, supra note 181, at 515–23. 
 208. It is quite surprising to observe that the same liberals who argue for the rights to freedom of 
religion, freedom of thought, and freedom of association on the basis of the central importance of 
religious and moral convictions and of enduring attachments and loyalties to individuals, and on 
their inability to imagine themselves apart from these convictions, attachments and loyalties (e.g., 
Rawls), reverse this theoretical assumption when dealing with the disadvantaged members of the 
community and assume that these members are quite capable of breaking with their convictions, 
attachments and loyalties and exiting the community. 
 209. Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic 
Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 214 (2002). 
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against women as rigorously, and arguably even more rigorously, than non-
dominant ones.  Restraining arbitrary and prejudiced power should start in 
those places in which it is most influential.  While it is true that many non-
dominant cultures and religions are as patriarchal, if not more so, than 
dominant ones, the hegemony of patriarchy depends first and foremost on the 
persistence of patriarchy in dominant religions and cultures, and not in their 
non-dominant counterparts.  Nevertheless, because the state should be equally 
concerned with the fate of each subordinated individual, it must act to end 
subordination in-non dominant groups as well. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As Angelina Grimke observed over a century and a half ago, not allowing 
women an equal voice in religion and culture is “a rank usurpation of power.”210  In 
a legal and political order which sees all political power as held by the sovereign 
and denies the political and legal significance of the tremendous power inherent 
in culture and religion, this usurpation of power is hardly noticed.  Even worse, 
in a legal and political order dominated by patriarchy, this usurpation of power 
is sanctioned and protected by masking its insidious nature behind distorted 
accounts of toleration, religious liberty, and cultural and associational rights.  
However, the foregoing inquiry into the way in which patriarchal religion and 
culture have been tailored to create and maintain the hegemony of patriarchy 
should make clear that until this “rank usurpation of power” is recognized and 
remedied, and our understanding of toleration, religious liberty, and cultural 
and associational rights is modified accordingly, equality for women will not be 
achieved. 
 
 210. THE PUBLIC YEARS supra note 1, at 197. 
